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Correcting an Evident Error:  
A Plea to Revise Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 
 
WILLIAM J. ACEVES* 
 
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Supreme Court held that foreign 
corporations are not subject to lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”). Written by Justice Kennedy, the highly fractured opinion offered 
several reasons for its holding. Although commentators have already 
criticized various aspects of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, one point has not 
received meaningful consideration and merits correction. In his plurality 
opinion, Justice Kennedy attached significance to the placement of the 
Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) as a statutory note to the ATS in 
the U.S. Code. In so doing, he disregarded longstanding practice and 
black letter law that the placement of a statutory note in the U.S. Code by 
the Office of Law Revision Counsel (“OLRC”) does not have any 
substantive impact on the law’s meaning, interpretation, or application. 
This error merits correction by the Court for several reasons. Although it 
undoubtedly influenced Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the ATS, its 
implications extend beyond this case. It will affect future ATS and TVPA 
cases. It also creates uncertainty over the status of the countless statutory 
notes that populate the federal code. And, it raises constitutional concerns 




There are hundreds of federal departments, agencies, and offices.1 
Many of them are well known; others operate in relative obscurity. These 
entities exist within each branch of the federal government. Despite their 
obscurity (or perhaps because of it), some of these entities can wield 
significant power. In 1992, one such entity made a decision that had a 
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1 See Hearing on “Examining the Federal Regulatory System to Improve Accountability, 
Transparency and Integrity” Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(prepared statement of Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee) 
(“The Federal Register indicates there are over 430 departments, agencies, and sub-
agencies in the federal government. And the pronouncements of this ever-expanding 
administrative state impact nearly every aspect of Americans’ daily lives.”). 




surprising impact on the Supreme Court’s April 2018 ruling in Jesner v. 
Arab Bank, PLC.2 
In Jesner, the Supreme Court held that foreign corporations are not 
subject to lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).3 Written by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the highly fractured opinion offered several 
reasons for its holding. According to the majority, federal courts should be 
reluctant to extend judicially created rights of action under the ATS, 
particularly in cases involving foreign corporations. Commentators have 
criticized various aspects of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, including its 
excessive deference to the corporate form and its misunderstanding of how 
international norms are enforced.4 But, one aspect of the opinion has not 
received meaningful consideration. Given the arcane nature of statutory 
placement, this is, perhaps, understandable.   
The Office of Law Revision Counsel (“OLRC” or “Office”) operates 
within the U.S. House of Representatives.5 When federal laws are enacted, 
the Office is responsible for the placement of these new laws in the United 
States Code (“Code”). On some occasions, Congress indicates where new 
legislation should be placed within the Code. On other occasions, 
Congress is silent, and placement of new legislation in the Code is left to 
OLRC. When OLRC makes these decisions, they are not meant to have 
any substantive impact on the law’s meaning, interpretation, or 
application.6 Accordingly, courts cannot attach any legal significance to 
the specific placement of these new laws in the Code. 
                                                
2 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
3 Id. at 27. The Alien Tort Statute provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
4 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Jesner v. Arab Bank: The Supreme Court Preserves the 
Possibility of Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 26, 
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55404/jesner-v-arab-bank-supreme-court-preserves-
possibility-human-rights-suits-u-s-corporations/ [https://perma.cc/AHX8-CW9M]; 
Samuel Moyn, Time to Pivot? Thoughts on Jesner v. Arab Bank, LAWFARE (Apr. 25, 
2018), https://lawfareblog.com/time-pivot-thoughts-jesner-v-arab-bank 
[https://perma.cc/DY2Y-7UEB]; Beth Stephens, Five Things I Don’t Like About the 
Jesner Opinion, HUM. RTS AT HOME BLOG (Apr. 29, 2018), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2018/04/five-things-i-dont-like-about-
the-jesner-decision.html [https://perma.cc/L6GT-A67K]; Christopher A. Whytock, 
Whither Human Rights Litigation After Jesner v. Arab Bank?, HUM. RTS. AT HOME BLOG 
(May 8, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2018/05/whither-human-
rights-litigation-after-jesner-v-arab-bank.html [https://perma.cc/D29K-E3BV]. But see 
Walter Olson, Jesner v Arab Bank: Court Tightens Lid on Alien Tort Statute, CATO INST. 
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/jesner-v-arab-bank-court-keeps-lid-alien-tort-
statute [https://perma.cc/3BBS-Q4QW].    
5 About the Office and the United States Code, OFFICE OF LAW REVISION COUNSEL, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.house.gov/about/info.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/TP34-32VY]. See generally Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not 
Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 283 (2007). 
6 See generally Richard J. McKinney, Assistant Law Librarian, Fed. Reserve Bd., The 
Authority of Statutes Placed in Section Notes of the U.S. Code, Presentation Before the 




But in Jesner, Justice Kennedy attached significance to OLRC’s 
placement of the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) as a statutory 
note to the ATS.7 He repeatedly referred to the TVPA as a “cause of 
action under the ATS created by Congress rather than the courts.”8 In so 
doing, he disregarded longstanding practice and black letter law that the 
placement of a statutory note in the U.S. Code by the Office does not have 
any substantive impact on the law’s meaning, interpretation, or 
application.9 
This error merits correction by the Court for several reasons. Although 
it undoubtedly affected Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the ATS in 
Jesner, it will also affect future ATS and TVPA cases. In addition, it raises 
uncertainty over the status of the countless statutory notes that populate 
the federal code. More broadly, this interpretation raises constitutional 
concerns by attaching legal significance to OLRC’s placement decisions. 
Part I of this Article examines OLRC’s work in preparing the United 
States Code. Part II then reviews the Jesner decision, and Part III explains 
Justice Kennedy’s misunderstanding of the relationship between the ATS 
and TVPA. Finally, Part IV proposes revisions to the Jesner decision that 
would provide a more accurate reflection of the legislative record and the 
historical role of OLRC in the codification process. 
 
I.  THE OFFICE OF LAW REVISION COUNSEL  
AND THE PROCESS OF CODIFICATION 
 
Congress established the Office of Law Revision Counsel in 1974, but 
its origins can be traced to the early twentieth century.10 OLRC operates 
within the U.S. House of Representatives. Although the Speaker of the 
House appoints the Law Revision Counsel, OLRC is non-partisan.11 Its 
principal purpose is “to develop and keep current an official and positive 
codification of the laws of the United States.”12 By statute, OLRC’s 
functions include the following: 
 
                                                                                                                     
LLSDC Legislative Research Special Interest Section Meeting (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.llsdc.org/assets/sourcebook/usc-notes.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB5Q-5MBM]. 
7 Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). The TVPA 
provides a federal cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing. It appears as a 
statutory note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  
8 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, slip op. at 20 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
9  See NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47:14, 347 (7th ed. 2014) (“[H]eadings and notes are not binding, may 
not be used to create an ambiguity, and do not control an act’s meaning by injecting a 
legislative intent or purpose not otherwise expressed in the law’s body.”). 
10 Pub. L. No. 93-554, 88 Stat. 1771 (1974). Efforts to compile federal law can be traced 
to the 19th and even the late 18th centuries. See Will Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can’t 
Find in the United States Code, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 133 (2010).  
11 2 U.S.C.S. §§ 285a, 285c (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-223). 
12 2 U.S.C.S. § 285a. 




(1) To prepare, and submit to the Committee on the 
Judiciary one title at a time, a complete compilation, 
restatement, and revision of the general and permanent 
laws of the United States which conforms to the 
understood policy, intent, and purpose of the Congress in 
the original enactments, with such amendments and 
corrections as will remove ambiguities, contradictions, 
and other imperfections both of substance and of form, 
separately stated, with a view to the enactment of each 
title as positive law. 
(2) To examine periodically all of the public laws enacted 
by the Congress and submit to the Committee on the 
Judiciary recommendations for the repeal of obsolete, 
superfluous, and superseded provisions contained therein. 
(3) To prepare and publish periodically a new edition of 
the United States Code (including those titles which are 
not yet enacted into positive law as well as those titles 
which have been so enacted), with annual cumulative 
supplements reflecting newly enacted laws. 
(4) To classify newly enacted provisions of law to their 
proper positions in the Code where the titles involved 
have not yet been enacted into positive law. 
(5) To prepare and submit periodically such revisions in 
the titles of the Code which have been enacted into 
positive law as may be necessary to keep such titles 
current . . . .13 
  
OLRC plays an important yet obscure role in codifying U.S. law. 
When the President signs a bill into law, the Office of the Federal Register 
assigns a Public Law number to the new law.14 These slip laws are 
eventually compiled in the Statutes at Large, which are “legal evidence of 
laws . . . in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the 
Territories and insular possessions of the United States.”15 OLRC works 
with the Office of the Federal Register to provide classifications “for 
inclusion as side notes . . . in the Statutes at Large.”16 These side notes 
                                                
13 2 U.S.C.S. § 285b (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-223). 
14 Public Laws, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/laws [https://perma.cc/34GC-H86L]. 
15 1 U.S.C.S. § 112 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-223). Although the Public Laws that 
appear in the Statutes at Large are considered legal evidence of the law, the side notes 
indicating their anticipated placement in the United States Code are not part of the 
statutory text. E-mail from Ralph V. Seep, Office of Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House 
of Representatives, to William J. Aceves, Professor of Law, California Western School of 
Law (July 17, 2018) (on file with author). 
16 About Classification of Laws to the United States Code, OFFICE OF LAW REVISION 
COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.house.gov/about_classificatio 
n.xhtml;jsessionid=E20314D11188CB2A3E552D966B94254F [https://perma.cc/NPV2-
2YGP] [hereinafter About Classification]. 




indicate the anticipated placement of the new laws in the United States 
Code.  
Because the Statutes at Large are released in chronological order and 
are not organized by subject, they are difficult to use in the day-to-day 
practice of law.17 To make the law more accessible, OLRC compiles and 
arranges the laws that appear in the Statutes at Large into the United States 
Code in a process “known as U.S. Code classification.” 18  In many 
respects, the purpose of the Code is to organize federal law so it is 
manageable and understandable.19 But in contrast to the Statutes at Large, 
only those titles of the Code that were specifically enacted by Congress as 
a whole are considered positive law and legal evidence of the law.20 All 
other titles of the Code are editorial compilations of federal statutes. They 
are considered non-positive law titles and are only prima facie evidence of 
the law.21 
When Congress does not specifically designate the placement of a new 
law in the United States Code, OLRC is responsible for the new law’s 
placement.22 And, because only Congress can add or amend a section of a 
positive law title in the Code, the Office is limited in its ability to place 
these new laws in the Code.23 On these occasions, the Office will place 
new laws as statutory notes or appendices to existing sections of positive 
                                                
17 Dorsey, supra note 5, at 284 (“We do not like to read session laws, of course. It can be 
tough going.”); see also HOLC Guide to Legislative Drafting, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE 
COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting_Legislation/Drafting_Guide.html 
[https://perma.cc/VWF5-GRWD] (“The only organizing principle behind the slip laws, 
and thus the Statutes at Large, is chronology. This makes it very difficult to find the law 
on a particular topic using those sources.”). 
18 About Classification, supra note 16. This process actually begins as soon as an enrolled 
bill becomes available. Id. The enrolled bill represents the final version of the bill 
submitted to the President for signature. 
19 See Dorsey, supra note 5, at 284 (emphasis in original) (“The Code is not law; it is a 
law locator, and a very useful one.”); see also Charles J. Zinn, Codification of the Laws, 
45 L. LIBR. J. 2, 4 (1952) (“We believe that it is our job to make the laws 
understandable.”). 
20 1 U.S.C.S. § 204(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-223) (“Whenever titles of [the] 
Code [] have been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the 
laws therein contained, in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the 
Territories and insular possessions of the United States.”). See Mary Whisner, The United 
States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive Law, 101 L. LIBR. J. 545, 547 (2009). 
21 See 1 U.S.C.S. § 204(a). The distinction between legal evidence and prima facie 
evidence was described by Charles Zinn, the head of the OLRC in 1957, in the following 
manner: “If you go into court and cite a section of the United States Code, your adversary 
may bring in a dozen Statutes at Large to show that what is in the Code is not an accurate 
statement. As a result, he may prevail because the Statutes at Large are legal evidence of 
the law, whereas the Code is only prima facie evidence.” Charles S. Zinn, Revision of the 
United States Code, 51 L. LIBR. J. 388, 389–90 (1958). 
22 See About Classification, supra note 16. 
23 Tress, supra note 10, at 151–52. 




law titles.24 These statutory notes or appendices can include an entire 
Public Law or only portions of those laws.25 These placement decisions by 
the Office are “a matter of opinion and judgment.”26 The Office considers 
various factors in making classification decisions. These decisions are 
generally determined by similarities between the new law and existing 
Code sections as well as ease of use.27 According to the Office, “[w]e try 
to insert the new law in that title of the Code where we think the average 
user will be most likely to look for it.”28 
Because OLRC, and not Congress, makes these placement decisions, 
no legal significance attaches to their location in the Code. Instead, “it is 
for the courts to find the meaning of all these statutes, all the amendments 
to those statutes, and all the amendments to the amendments.”29 The 
Office has emphatically affirmed these principles:  
 
A provision of a Federal statute is the law whether the 
provision appears in the Code as section text or as a 
statutory note, and even when it does not appear in the 
Code at all. The fact that a provision is set out as a note is 
merely the result of an editorial decision and has no effect 
on its meaning or validity.30 
 
Three points bear emphasis. First, OLRC is responsible for the 
placement of new laws in the U.S. Code when Congress does not 
specifically designate their placement in the Code. Second, these new laws 
are still binding even if OLRC places them as statutory notes within 
existing sections of the Code. Third, courts cannot attach any legal 
significance to the specific placement of these new laws in the Code.  
Federal courts have long recognized that the placement of statutory 
notes by OLRC in the U.S. Code does not affect their meaning. In 
numerous decisions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged these 
principles of codification and statutory interpretation.31 In United States v. 
                                                
24 See About Classification, supra note 16; see also Michael J. Lynch, The U.S. Code, the 
Statutes at Large, and Some Peculiarities of Codification, 16 LEGAL REFERENCE SERV. 
Q. 69, 77–81 (1997). Some commentators have criticized the use of statutory notes 
because they are difficult to locate and undermine the organizational value of the Code. 
Tress, supra note 10, at 153. 
25 Detailed Guide to the United States Code Content and Features, OFFICE OF THE LAW 
REVISION COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.house.gov/detailed_ 
guide.xhtml [https://perma.cc/FSC8-FA6S] [hereinafter Detailed Guide]. 
26 Zinn, supra note 19, at 3. 
27 See About Classification, supra note 16. 
28 Zinn, supra note 19, at 3. 
29 Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 182 (1986).  
30 Detailed Guide, supra note 25. 
31 See, e.g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod’s Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957) 
(quoting Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 198–99 (1912)) (“The change 
of arrangement, which placed portions of what was originally a single section in two 
separated sections cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment. 




Welden, for example, the Supreme Court was interpreting the 
Appropriations Act of February 25, 1903⎯portions of which were 
subsequently codified in the United States Code. 32  The Court was 
confronted with two sources of law, which the Court found to be 
inconsistent: the original Act of Congress and the subsequent codification 
of that law in the Code. In Welden, the Court had to decide which applied. 
It concluded that it must rely on the original Act of Congress if there was 
an inconsistency between the Statutes at Large and the Code: 
 
Certainly where, as here, the ‘change of arrangement’ was 
made by a codifier without the approval of Congress, it 
should be given no weight. ‘If construction [of a section of 
the United States Code which has not been enacted into 
positive law] is necessary, recourse must be had to the 
original statutes themselves.’33 Accordingly, in order to 
construe the immunity provision of the Appropriations Act 
of February 25, 1903, we must read it in the context of the 
entire Act, rather than in the context of the ‘arrangement’ 
selected by the codifier.34 
 
Other Supreme Court decisions have made similar determinations, further 
highlighting the distinction between Congress and the “codifiers.”35 
The lower courts have repeated this understanding regarding the legal 
significance of placement decisions in the U.S. Code. In Springs v. Stone, 
for example, the federal district court was interpreting the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”), which was adopted in response to 
the attacks of September 11, 2001.36 Because Congress did not indicate 
where the ATSA should be placed in the Code, OLRC placed it as a 
statutory note to another federal statute.37 According to the district court, 
this placement decision did not affect its interpretation: “[t]he laws of the 
United States are evidenced by the Statutes at Large, not by their 
placement within the United States Code.”38 Other federal courts have 
                                                                                                                     
For it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended 
to change their effect, unless such intention is clearly expressed.”); Stephan v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943) (“[T]he Code establishes ‘prima facie’ the laws of the 
United States. But the very meaning of ‘prima facie’ is that the Code cannot prevail over 
the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.”). 
32 United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 96 (1964). 
33 Id. at 99 n.4 (quoting Murrell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 160 F.2d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 
1947)). 
34 Welden, 377 U.S. at 99 n.4. 
35 Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 161 (1934) (“The compilers of the Code were not 
empowered by Congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing 
so. As to that the command of Congress is too clear to be misread.”). 
36 Springs v. Stone, 362 F. Supp. 2d 686, 690 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
37 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2012)). 
38 Springs, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 697 n.7. 




made similar determinations, indicating that the placement of a law as a 
statutory note in the Code without the approval of Congress “is of no legal 
significance,”39 “of no moment,”40 and carries “no weight.”41 
In sum, a statutory note’s placement in the United States Code by 
OLRC should have no impact on its meaning, interpretation, or 
application. Courts may not attach any legal significance to the specific 
placement of these new laws in the Code. But, this longstanding practice 
and black letter principle were disregarded in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC. 
 
II. THE JESNER DECISION 
 
 In Jesner, thousands of victims of terrorist attacks in the Middle East 
brought five civil actions under the ATS against Arab Bank, PLC.42 The 
plaintiffs alleged Arab Bank had served as a financial intermediary to 
several designated terrorist organizations, thereby allowing them to 
conduct campaigns of violence against innocent civilians.43 The district 
court dismissed the lawsuits in 2015, relying on circuit precedent that 
corporations may not be sued under the ATS, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal.44  In its decision, the Second Circuit suggested the 
Supreme Court was best situated to address the issue of corporate 
liability.45 A divided en banc panel of the Second Circuit declined to 
rehear the case.46 In a sharply worded dissent from the denial of en banc 
review, three judges argued that the Second Circuit’s earlier decision 
rejecting corporate liability was a “flawed opinion,” a “lone ‘outlier’ 
among ATS cases,” and that it was “blunting the natural development of 
the law.”47 
 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s 
decision and held that foreign corporations are not subject to civil liability 
under the ATS. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy argued that 
federal courts should be reluctant to extend judicially created rights of 
action.48 Such hesitation, which is informed by separation of powers 
considerations, should be even more pronounced in cases involving 
                                                
39 Stadther v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 11-1297, 2012 WL 4372570, at *4 n.1 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 7, 2012). 
40 Conyers v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 388 F.3d 1380, 1382 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
41 Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 428 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Welden, 
377 U.S. 95, 99 (1964)). 
42 Two of the five lawsuits also raised claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which 
provides a cause of action for acts of international terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). 
43 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
44 In re Arab Bank PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144, 148, 158 (2d Cir. 
2015) (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 
569 U.S. 108 (2013)). 
45 See id. at 157.   
46 In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 822 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2016).   
47 Id. at 41 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
48 See Jesner, slip op. at 18–19. 




corporate entities and foreign nations.49 In these cases, Justice Kennedy 
indicated that courts should defer to the political branches of 
government. 50  “[A]bsent further action from Congress it would be 
inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations.”51 
In Part I of the Jesner opinion, the Court made its initial reference to 
the TVPA. The majority examined the development of ATS jurisprudence, 
beginning with the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
which held that the ATS provided subject matter jurisdiction in cases of 
torture.52 After describing the Filartiga decision, the Court addressed, 
albeit briefly, the TVPA: 
 
In the midst of debates in the courts of appeal over whether 
the court in Filartiga was correct in holding that plaintiffs 
could bring ATS actions based on modern human-rights 
laws absent an express cause of action created by an 
additional statute, Congress enacted the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).53  
 
The Court indicated the TVPA was “codified as a note following the 
ATS” and that it “creates an express cause of action for victims of torture 
and extrajudicial killing in violation of international law.” 54  After 
describing the adoption of the TVPA, the Court went on to discuss 
subsequent developments in ATS jurisprudence, including its decisions in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.55 In 
these cases, the Court highlighted the foreign policy implications of ATS 
litigation and used this reasoning to narrow the statute’s reach. 
In Part II(B)(2) of the Jesner opinion, Justice Kennedy, now joined 
only by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, returned to the TVPA. 
To better interpret the ATS, Justice Kennedy indicated the Court should 
look to “analogous statutes for guidance on the appropriate boundaries of 
judge-made causes of action.”56  According to Justice Kennedy, such 
references are particularly important in cases involving international law.57 
“Here, the logical place to look for a statutory analogy to an ATS 
common-law action is the TVPA—the only cause of action under the ATS 
                                                
49 Id. at 19, 25–27. 
50 Id. at 19. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 9 (discussing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)). In Filartiga, 
the Second Circuit held that torture violates international law and that the ATS provides 
federal jurisdiction “whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an 
alien within our borders . . . .” Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
53 Jesner, slip op. at 9 (citations omitted). 
54 Id. at 10. 
55 Id. at 10–11 (discussing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013)). 
56 Jesner, slip op. at 19–20 (citations omitted). 
57 Id. at 20 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726). 




created by Congress rather than the courts.” 58  In support of this 
interpretation, Justice Kennedy referenced the House and Senate reports 
for the TVPA and quoted from the House report: “[a]s explained above, 
Congress drafted the TVPA to ‘establish an unambiguous and modern 
basis for a cause of action’ under the ATS.”59 
Having established the connection between the ATS and TVPA, 
Justice Kennedy then explained the implications of this connection for 
purposes of interpreting the ATS: 
 
Congress took care to delineate the TVPA’s boundaries. In 
doing so, it could weigh the foreign-policy implications of 
its rule. Among other things, Congress specified who may 
be liable, created an exhaustion requirement, and 
established a limitations period. In Kiobel, the Court 
recognized that “[e]ach of these decisions carries with it 
significant foreign policy implications.” 60  The TVPA 
reflects Congress’ considered judgment of the proper 
structure for a right of action under the ATS. Absent a 
compelling justification, courts should not deviate from that 
model.61 
 
Thus, Justice Kennedy viewed the TVPA as “the only cause of action 
under the ATS created by Congress rather than the courts.”62 He reiterated 
this position by emphasizing that “[t]he TVPA reflects Congress’ 
considered judgment of the proper structure for a right of action under the 
ATS.”63 
And, having established a formal connection between the two statutes, 
Justice Kennedy went on to graft the TVPA’s restrictions to ATS claims. 
“Congress’ decision to exclude liability for corporations in actions brought 
under the TVPA is all but dispositive of the present case.” 64  This 
ultimately led the Court to hold “foreign corporations may not be 
defendants in suits brought under the ATS.”65 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued a lengthy dissenting opinion joined by 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan. She questioned the majority’s 
approach to corporate liability under international law and argued the 
decision would absolve foreign corporations from responsibility for 
human rights abuses. 66  According to Justice Sotomayor, “[t]he text, 
                                                
58 Jesner, slip op. at 20. 
59 Id. (citation omitted). 
60 Id. (citing Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117). 
61 Jesner, slip op. at 20. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (emphasis added). 
64 Id. In an earlier case, the Court held corporations cannot be sued under the TVPA. See 
id. (citing Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449 (2012)). 
65 Jesner, slip op. at 27. 
66 Id. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 




history, and purpose of the ATS, as well as the long and consistent history 
of corporate liability in tort, confirm that tort claims for law-of-nations 
violations may be brought against corporations under the ATS.”67 She also 
disagreed with the plurality’s reliance on the TVPA in interpreting the 
ATS.68 
Jesner represents the Court’s most recent retrenchment of the Alien 
Tort Statute. By focusing on the foreign policy implications of ATS 
litigation, it follows the reasoning of the Court’s earlier decisions in Sosa 
and Kiobel. However, the Court’s reliance on the TVPA to support its 
reasoning is different. 
 
III. ASSESSING THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ATS AND TVPA 
 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Jesner is built upon a 
misunderstanding of the TVPA and its relationship to the ATS. In Part I, 
the majority opinion indicates the TVPA was “codified as a note following 
the ATS . . . .”69 This statement is an accurate description of the TVPA’s 
current placement in the United States Code. In Part II(B)(2), however, the 
plurality opinion mischaracterizes the relationship between the ATS and 
TVPA. According to Justice Kennedy, Congress drafted the TVPA “to 
‘establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action’ under 
the ATS,” and the TVPA is “the only cause of action under the ATS 
created by Congress rather than the courts.”70  
In support of these statements, Justice Kennedy cited language from 
the House and Senate reports to the TVPA.71 However, the cited language 
does not support these statements or reflect the proper relationship 
between the two statutes. The House report indicated “[t]he TVPA would 
establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action that has 
been successfully maintained under an existing law, section 1350 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien Tort Claims Act) . . . .”72 The Senate 
Report used nearly identical language.73 Thus, the House and Senate 
Reports did not indicate the TVPA was established, authorized, or adopted 
under the ATS. At most, they indicate the ATS inspired the adoption of 
the TVPA and that the two statutes were analogous.74 There is certainly 
strong support in the legislative record for this limited proposition.75 
                                                
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 25–29. 
69 Id. at 10 (majority opinion). 
70 Id. at 20 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991); S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4–5 (1991)). 
71 See id.  
72 H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991) (emphasis added). 
73 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991). 
74 Both the House and Senate reports reference Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic as the impetus behind the movement to adopt the TVPA. 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (discussing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 103 (1985)); S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (same). In 
Tel-Oren, Judge Bork argued that “an explicit grant of a cause of action” is essential 




More significantly, statutory construction must always begin with the 
language employed by Congress.76 The TVPA contains no mention of the 
ATS.77 Instead, the TVPA’s preamble indicates it was adopted to carry out 
U.S. obligations under international law “pertaining to the protection of 
human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from 
an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.”78 This 
language appears in the enrolled bill and the Statutes at Large, but OLRC 
omitted the preamble when it placed the TVPA in the U.S. Code.79 
However, the preamble is considered part of the legislative enactment; 
therefore, it should be accorded some weight in statutory interpretation.80  
The TVPA is also silent on its placement in the U.S. Code. 81 
Accordingly, OLRC was responsible for determining its proper placement 
in the Code. And, in fact, it was OLRC that placed the TVPA as a 
statutory note to the ATS.82 Because Title 28 is a positive law title, the 
Office did not have the authority to add or revise any of the existing Code 
sections. Thus, it could not amend the language of the ATS or place the 
TVPA in a new Code section. It could only attach the TVPA as a statutory 
note to an existing section of the Code, which it did at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.83 
Under established practice, therefore, the TVPA’s placement as a statutory 
note to the ATS has no legal significance when interpreting these statutes. 
                                                                                                                     
“before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a 
federal tribunal.” Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). 
75 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4; S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4–5; see also The Torture 
Victim Protection Act: Hearing and Markup on H.R. 1417 Before the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 34–36 (1988) (prepared statement of Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York, Committee on International Human Rights). 
76 See Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 
765, 772 (1984) (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983) 
(citations omitted)). In fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that reliance on 
legislative history is unnecessary when a statute’s language is clear. See Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 236 n.8 (2010). 
77 The enrolled bill does not mention the ATS. See Torture Victim Protection Act, H.R. 
2092, 102d Cong. (1992) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 3, 1992). 
78 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992).  
79 As a general policy, the LRC Office does not include preambles in the U.S. Code. E-
mail from Ralph V. Seep, Office of Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to William J. Aceves, Professor of Law, California Western School of 
Law (July 17, 2018) (on file with author). 
80 See generally 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:14 (7th ed. 2017). 
81 The enrolled bill contains no reference to the United States Code. See Torture Victim 
Protection Act, H.R. 2092, 102d Cong. (1992) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 3, 1992). In 
contrast, the earliest version of the TVPA did, in fact, address its placement in the Code. 
H.R. 4756 would have amended Title 28 of the Code by adding a new section that 
granted federal courts jurisdiction over claims of torture or extrajudicial killing. See H.R. 
4756, 99th Cong. § 3 (1986). See Kathryn L. Pryor, Does the Torture Victim Protection 
Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 969, 
1015–16 (1989) (describing the earlier version of the TVPA). 
82  E-mail from Ralph V. Seep, Office of Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to William J. Aceves, Professor of Law, California Western School of 
Law (June 1, 2018) (on file with author). 
83 Id. 




There are, of course, other problems with interpreting the TVPA as a 
cause of action under the ATS. As Justice Sotomayor recognized in her 
Jesner dissent, “[o]n its face, the TVPA is different from the ATS in 
several significant ways.”84 Most significantly, the ATS is a jurisdictional 
statute that also grants federal courts limited authority to establish a cause 
of action “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”85 The TVPA, by contrast, is 
available to both aliens and U.S. citizens, but it only creates a cause of 
action for torture and extrajudicial killing.86 
If the TVPA is considered a cause of action under the ATS, U.S. 
citizens would be unable to bring TVPA claims because the jurisdictional 
grant in the ATS only extends to aliens. Presumably, U.S. citizens can rely 
on the jurisdictional grant afforded by the federal question statute to bring 
TVPA claims.87 However, such a bifurcated approach to TVPA claims is 
awkward and there is nothing in the TVPA’s text or legislative history to 
support it. For these reasons, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged “[i]t makes 
little sense, then, to conclude that the TVPA has dispositive comparative 
value in discerning the scope of liability under the ATS.”88 
The formal relationship between the two statutes becomes even more 
tenuous when considered in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain.89 In Sosa, the Court made clear the ATS functioned 
on its own and did not require further implementing legislation.90 To hold 
otherwise would have left the ATS a dead letter. According to Justice 
Souter:  
 
[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress 
did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be 
placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state 
legislature that might, some day, authorize the creation of 
causes of action or itself decide to make some element of 
the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners.91  
 
                                                
84 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, slip op. at 25 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
85 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
86 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 
(1992). 
87 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). Courts have previously indicated that TVPA claims may 
also be brought under the federal question statute. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 
246 (2d Cir. 1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995). 
88 Jesner, slip op. at 25–26 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Mohamad v. Palestinian 
Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 458 (2012) (reasoning that the ATS has “no comparative value” in 
assessing the meaning of the word “individual” as used in the TVPA). 
89 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
90 Id. at 724. 
91 Id. at 719. 




When the Court in Sosa addressed the TVPA, it viewed the statute as 
distinct from the ATS and reinforced this point with several references to 
the TVPA’s legislative history.92 
Jesner is not the first case in which this issue has arisen. The D.C. 
Circuit previously addressed the relationship between the ATS and TVPA 
in Belhas v. Ya’alon, which involved an ATS/TVPA lawsuit brought 
against a high-ranking Israeli government official accused of complicity in 
the shelling of a U.N. compound in Lebanon that killed dozens of 
civilians.93 The court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the lawsuit 
by holding the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) conferred 
immunity upon individuals acting in their official capacity for a foreign 
state.94 In considering the plaintiffs’ claims, the court rejected the assertion 
that the TVPA abrogated the immunity of foreign government officials.95 
It also noted the TVPA did not amend the FSIA.96 In fact, the court 
attached some significance to the TVPA’s placement with the ATS and 
suggested Congress was responsible for this connection: “When Congress 
passed the TVPA in 1991, it did not amend the FSIA and instead 
appended it to the ATCA [ATS], a statute the Supreme Court held 
in Amerada Hess to be subject to all provisions in the FSIA.”97 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Stephen Williams agreed with the 
majority’s holding although he took issue with its analysis of the TVPA’s 
legislative history.98 He rightly noted the TVPA’s placement in the United 
States Code should have no impact on its interpretation: 
 
[T]he majority states that “[w]hen Congress passed the 
TVPA in 1991, it did not amend the FSIA and instead 
appended it to the ATCA, a statute the Supreme Court held 
in Amerada Hess to be subject to all provisions in the 
FSIA.” Indeed Congress did not amend the FSIA, but a 
further inference of congressional intent from the 
placement of the statute within the United States Code is 
dubious, at least absent some indication—lacking here—
that Congress itself, rather than simply the Office of Law 
Revision Counsel directed that placement.99 
 
                                                
92 Id. at 728, 731. 
93 Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 
560 U.S. 305 (2010). The Court in Samantar held that the FSIA does not apply to former 
foreign government officials. 560 U.S. at 308.   
94 Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1283. 
95 Id. at 1288–89. 
96 Id. at 1289. 
97 Id. (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989)). 
98 See Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1293 (Williams, J., concurring). 
99 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 1289 (majority opinion)) (first citing Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); then citing 2 
U.S.C. §§ 285–285g (2008)). 




The Belhas decision reveals the mischief that arises when courts attach 
significance to the placement of the TVPA as a statutory note to the 
ATS.100 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Jesner both exemplifies 
and magnifies this problem.101 
 
IV. REVISING THE JESNER DECISION 
 
In Jesner, Justice Kennedy’s description of the relationship between 
the ATS and TVPA is simply wrong. The plurality opinion is particularly 
troubling in light of the Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that courts 
should defer to Congress in these cases because of their foreign policy 
implications.102 Instead of relying on Congress, the plurality relies on the 
placement decisions of the Office of Law Revision Counsel. The opinion 
also raises uncertainty over the status of statutory notes in the United 
States Code because it implies their placement in the Code by OLRC is 
relevant for purposes of statutory interpretation. For these reasons, the 
Court should revise the opinion to correct this error.103 
                                                
100 Other courts have also mischaracterized the TVPA as an amendment to the ATS. See, 
e.g., Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 743 (9th Cir. 2018) (referring to the TVPA as 
“an amendment to the Alien Tort Claims Act”). 
101 Commentators have made similar misstatements regarding the relationship between 
the ATS and TVPA. See, e.g., Luisa Antoniolli, Taking Legal Pluralism Seriously: The 
Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of International Law Before U.S. Federal Courts, 12 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 651, 658 n.29 (2005) (asserting that the TVPA was passed 
as an amendment to the ATS); Ekaterina Apostolova, The Relationship Between the Alien 
Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 640, 642 
(2010) (“The fact that the TVPA was codified as a note to the ATS implies that they are 
intended to interact closely.”); Carole Basri, The Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries: 
An Examination of Legal Rights—A Case Study of the Human Rights Violations of Iraqi 
Jews, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 656, 715 n.315 (2003) (referring to the TVPA as an 
amendment to the ATS); Anthony Blackburn, Striking A Balance to Reform the Alien 
Tort Statute: A Recommendation for Congress, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1051, 1070–71 
(2013) (“Historically, Congress codified the TVPA as a note to the ATS, which implies 
intent for them to interact closely.”).  
102 See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, slip op. at 18–19 (U.S. Apr. 24, 
2018) (“The political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional 
capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
727 (2004) (“While the absence of congressional action addressing private rights of 
action under an international norm is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a 
right when it creates a statute, the possible collateral consequences of making 
international rules privately actionable argue for judicial caution.”). 
103 This proposal shares some of the features of recent scholarship that rewrites important 
judicial decisions. See, e.g., FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
(Rosemary Hunter et al. eds., 2010); INTEGRATED HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: 
REWRITING HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS (Eva Brems & Ellen Desment eds., 2017); WHAT 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL 
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack Balkin ed., 
2002). Unlike prior scholarship, however, this proposal asks the Court to revise its own 
opinion. 




The Supreme Court often revises its opinions after they are issued.104 
This controversial practice occurs for various reasons. On some occasions, 
the Court is simply correcting grammatical or format errors.105 But on 
other occasions, these revisions are more substantive.106 Although the 
Court has engaged in this practice for many years, it only began 
publicizing its revisions in 2015.107 Most commentators appear to support 
this practice as long as it is transparent.108 
In fact, the Court has already made some revisions to its Jesner 
decision. Six days after the Court issued its original decision, it released a 
revised version of the decision on its website.109 Minor corrections, which 
did not affect the Court’s reasoning or holding, were made to the opinions 
of Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor.110  
The plurality’s position on the relationship between the ATS and 
TVPA merits similar treatment. The following revisions would address 
this error without requiring any additional drafting. These revisions would 
appear on page twenty of Justice Kennedy’s slip opinion and would 
simply delete the language that refers to the TVPA as a cause of action 
under the ATS: 
 
Here, the logical place to look for a statutory analogy to an 
ATS common-law action is the TVPA—the only cause of 
action under the ATS created by Congress rather than the 
courts. As explained above, Congress drafted the TVPA to 
“establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of 
action” under the ATS. H. R. Rep., at 3; S. Rep., at 4–5. 
                                                
104 See Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 540, 555 (2014) (“[T]he Court makes all sorts of revisions, ranging from the most 
mundane to the most intriguing, with the vast majority not surprisingly falling into the 
first category.”); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Post-Decision Revisions of Supreme Court 
Decisions, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 25, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/25/post-decision-
revisions-of-supreme-court-opinions/?utm_term=.120d0b665b69 
[https://perma.cc/5CMU-ACMF]; Adam Liptak, Final Word on U.S. Law Isn’t: Supreme 
Court Keeps Editing, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/ 
us/final-word-on-us-law-isnt-supreme-court-keeps-editing.html [https://perma.cc/DS2Q-
KCBS]. 
105 Lazarus, supra note 104, at 562–63. 
106 Id. at 569–73. 
107 Ryan Gabrielson, Legal Footnote: You Have to Look Hard to See the Supreme Court 
Correct Its Mistakes, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 2, 2018, 1:20 PM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/legal-footnote-you-have-to-look-hard-to-see-the-supreme-court-correct-its-
mistakes [https://perma.cc/W7BA-MRBM]. 
108 See Charles Rothfeld, Should the Supreme Court Correct its Mistakes?, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 56, 61–62 (2014) (suggesting that the Court should disclose “every change that it 
makes to every opinion after initial publication”). 
109  See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-499diff_868c.pdf (providing original 
version next to revised version and noting revisions). 
110 See id. at 9 (replacing “Peruvian” with “Paraguayan”); id. at 10 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (making formatting corrections).  




Congress took care to delineate the TVPA’s boundaries. In 
doing so, it could weigh the foreign-policy implications of 
its rule. Among other things, Congress specified who may 
be liable, created an exhaustion requirement, and 
established a limitations period. In Kiobel, the Court 
recognized that “[e]ach of these decisions carries with it 
significant foreign policy implications.” The TVPA reflects 
Congress’ considered judgment of the proper structure for a 
right of action under the ATS. Absent a compelling 
justification, courts should not deviate from that model.111  
 
These revisions can be presented to the Reporter of Decisions at the 
Supreme Court, who could “then refer the matter to the appropriate Justice 
for consideration.”112 The revisions could easily be made before the final, 
official text of the Court’s opinion is released.113 Past practice suggests 
such revisions could be made without the need for rehearing or even prior 
notice to the parties.114 
Significantly, these revisions would not change the outcome of the 
Jesner case. Foreign corporations would still be immune from civil 
liability under the ATS. But, these revisions would eliminate the 
inaccuracies regarding the placement of the TVPA and its relationship to 
the ATS.  
If the Supreme Court does not remedy this error, the lower courts 
should not repeat it. Quite simply, the plurality opinion’s understanding of 
the connection between the ATS and TVPA is wrong. Although the lower 
courts remain bound by the Court’s limited holding in Jesner, they are 
certainly not bound to recognize a connection between the ATS and 
TVPA that does not exist.115 Recognition is even less warranted in light of 
the plurality’s limited reach, particularly when the three votes of the 
plurality on this issue are compared with the four votes of the dissent that 
reject the connection. Accordingly, the reasoning behind the Jesner 
                                                
111 See Jesner, slip op. at 20 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Kiobel v. 
Royal Duty Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013)). 
112 STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 32 (10th ed. 2013). 
113  See Information About Opinions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/info_opinions.aspx [https://perma.cc/SWP7-
TY86] (describing the process by which Supreme Court opinions are released to the 
public and printed). Justice Kennedy’s retirement may complicate such efforts although 
the Court presumably has some mechanism for addressing these situations. Although the 
Court could also clarify this issue in a future case, there is no guarantee the Court will 
address an ATS or TVPA case in the near future, if at all. 
114 Lazarus, supra note 104, at 566–72. 
115 There are occasions when lower courts may deviate from Supreme Court precedent. 
See generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (assessing the reasons for hierarchical 
precedent); Timothy Schwartz, Cases Time Forgot: Why Judges Can Sometimes Ignore 
Controlling Precedent, 56 EMORY L.J. 1475 (2007) (examines the phenomena of judges 
ignoring precedent). 









Attaching significance to the placement of a statutory note in the 
United States Code poses risks. It can imply connections that Congress did 
not intend, thereby affecting statutory interpretation. But it can also have 
constitutional implications because it conflates OLRC decisions with 
congressional action. This is precisely what happened in Jesner. This 
outcome is particularly ironic because the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
admonished lower courts to defer to Congress in ATS and TVPA cases. 
For these reasons, OLRC’s placement decisions should have no bearing in 
statutory interpretation. 
Correcting Jesner’s evident error would ensure that future cases 
involving the ATS and TVPA are informed by the will of Congress 
instead of the decisions of the Office of Law Revision Counsel. More 
broadly, these revisions would reaffirm longstanding practice regarding 
the proper interpretation of statutory notes in the United States Code. 
 
                                                
116 Lower courts presented with ATS or TVPA cases could, for example, give a narrow 
construction to the plurality’s reasoning in Jesner, if they give it any weight at all. See 
generally Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of 
Normative Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189 (2014) (arguing that stare decisis is not 
always applied consistently by the courts); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and 
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001) (criticizing the current 
approach to stare decisis and suggesting a new, more refined theory); Richard M. Re, 
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2014) (discussing 
lower courts’ practice of narrowly interpreting Supreme Court precedent and indicating 
that the practice can be acceptable when lower courts adopt reasonable interpretations). 
